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EMERGING LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF THE DEEP SEAS AND POLAR REGIONS
Richard B. Bilder
The title of this It'cture reflects a
profound change in the human condition. For, of all the generations of
Adam, only in our own generation has
man for the first time become truly
capable of making the world his own.
P('rhaps a Martian might sec mor('
dearly than ourselves that mali's ltatural habitat the environment for
which we arc physiologically suited is Tl'ally a humblr and rrstric.ted OllC.
Far from being monarchs of all we survey, our normal state is to crawl like
crabs on the bed of a great ocean of gas
-restricted, in fact, to its nonliquid and
more temperate portions. The vaster
portions of our planet - the ",eas and
their depths, the des('rts, tIll' polar
f('gions, tIl(' sky - are lll'yoncl (hI'
rt'at'h of our unaided physiologit'al
capabilities. Thus, in order to leav(' this
narrow ('nvironmental niche WI' have
somehow to carry our natural environment - a solid platform, air, warmth,
energy sources - with us. And for
most of the million years or so that
scientists say man has been around,
this has been impossible.
Man's conquest of his world has
therefore depended on a slow mastering of the technology of artificial environments. Very long ago the first skin
garments, fire, containers for carrying
food and water, and primitive shelters
permitted us to probe in the desert and
towards the poles. With the first log
raft we could, in essence, carry the land

with us onto the surface of the waters,
making the waters a highway rather
than a barrier. But from the time of
those first great inventions to the present, a period of perhaps scores of
thousands of years, much of our planet
has remained denied to us.
Viewrd in this context the far-reaching significance of currrnt technological achievements becomes apparent. For
today, in our own moment of time,
these physiological barriers are finally
crumbling. Modern technology has now
made possible our development and
transportation of complex artificial en·
vironments capable of sustaining us
virtually wherevl'r WI' wish - the polar
rrgions. the vast new world ben('ath the
seas, the stratosphere, or even the horizons of outer space.
Our specific concern today, however,
is with the special legal implications of
this development. And, surprising, prrhaps unromantic, as it may seem, there
are such legal implications. For whereever men go and interact with their
fellows on a continuous basis - be it
the polar regions, the deserts, the seas,
their drpths, or outer space - they
need rules. Whether this human interaction is on the very simple level of
family living or on the complex level
of the relations brtwern the organized
aggregates of human beings that we call
nations, men need some basis for predicting other people's behavior and
for resolving controversies if they are
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to rationally order their activities. The
location of such interaction is irrelevant. What is important is that situations exist which raise the potentiality
for human conflict and that only rules
can avoid or minimize the social losses
which such conflict involves. Thus, as
man explores and exploits exotic environments his laws must follow him.
It is clear, then, that we need rules
for the polar regions and the deep seas,
and, of course, for outer space as well
-rules governing access and permitted
uses; rules governing exploitation of
resources; rules governing personal
conduct and liability; rules for the
srulement of disputes; in fact, many of
the great variety of rules that every
domestic legal system provides. One
qurstion, of course, is what all of these
various rules should be. However, in
the context of our existing international
legal order, with its characteristic decentralization of rulemaking authority
as between states, there is an even
more difficult threshold question - the
question of who is to make such rules.
Should it be each individual state itself,
and, j[ so, how is :mch rulemaking
authority to hr divided and conflicts
resoh-ed? Or should sprcific rules be
determined in advance by all interested
states by international agreement? Or
should interested states delegate to
soml.' international organization such
rulemaking authority?
The question of who is to make the
rules may sound abstract, but the
stakes are real and high, for the answer
to this question has much to do with
what the substantive rules, in fact, turn
out to he. Obviously, differrnt statcs
may wish diffcrent rules, and a rule
whirh is good for one state and serves
its intl.'rests best may work against the
iull.'rests of anothl.'r. Thus, if we decidl'
that a particular statl' - for rxampl<-,
thr Sovirt Union - may lrgitimatl'ly
make authoritativr rules as to all con-

duct in a particular area of the derp
sl'as or polar r('gions, it may weIl
rstablish rules favoring its own activitiC's and nationals and prcventing
Aml'ricans or othrr alirns from enterin~ the area or rxploiting its rrsonrers.
Of course. this problrm of who is to
make the rulrs govrrning rondurt in
Ihl' 1'In-ironnH'nls i:-: simply OJl(' faeC't
of tIll' hro:I<II'r prnhll'm of tIll' alloeaIion of pmn'r and rull'making ('(HIIIII'II'IH'(' amOIl!! :-:tatl':-: in our prl'''I'nl
world. and solutions wiII nrerssarily
draw hruvily on establishrd principles
and prC'crdents. Since you arc probably
familiar with these' jurisdictional conrepls from previous lrctures. I will
simply stn'ss a few points.
First. emrrgent jurisdictional rules.
likr all international rules, lend to be a
resultant of the realitiC's of various
slales' interests and effeclive power.
WIJ('IIlI'r th('sl' rulC's an' reaehed !ly
exprrss agrrrm('nt or hy thr growth of
custom. they drvelop out of the pressures which each state can bring on
oth('rs for acceptancr of Ihr rule it
IwIievrs brst serves its national poliey.
Various states' actions. as determined
hy foreign office drcisions. rrflect the
,"aried stren~th of thl'se pressurrs and
may. owr time. take on the aura of
II'~itima("y. Of rourse. it is important
to renwmhrr that a state's assessment
of any proposed rule will properly
wei~h not only its immrdian; intl'rrsts
hut its long·range interrst as well. Since
rwry rull' is availahle also to othrrs,
derisionmakers must kl'ep in mind the
polPntiality of futurr "mirror-image"
invoealions of thl' rule hy foreign
offieials.
Thus, to understand the legal rrgimes
which devrlop in the new environmrnts
WI' must look not only at kgal "rel'e.
dl'nts involved hUI also at the pe[('l'ivC'd
inlert'!'ts of tl1l' \"ariou~ ~tatl's cOlleernecl
ancl thrir willingn('ss and ahility 10
exert pressure on other states for ac-
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cpptancc or acquicscence in proposed
rules promoting those interests. The
rulcs that emerge are often simply tentativc compromises among these compcting prcssur('s.
Sccond, the importancc of the eonc('pt of territory for our purposes is
Ihat it is. in csscnc('. a shorthanel way
of <l1I(wal in;! 10 <I parI ielllar ~Iah' pn'dominanl ruh'makin;! aUlhorily in <I
!!('n!!raphieal an'<I. To l'ay Ihal a 1'1all'
('<III claim krrilory in thl' IU'\\" ('II\'irtlll'
nH'nll' is 10 say il ('an acquire l'ueh
prr,dominant jurisdiction, including thc
right to cxclude others from the arca or
its uscs. Conversely, to say that an
I'nvironmcnt is res coml1wnis - common prOflerty not subjcct to territorial
acquisition - is to deny the possibility
of such overall preclusive national jurisdiction.
But it is worth noting that it is the
facts of c[cctive rult'making authority
rather than the words ''I.e lISI' that really
count. For exam pIc, we tend to think of
the doctrine that the high seas are res
communis as a self-evidl'nt truth. Howevcr, you arc awarl' that this concept
has really had a rathcr ephl'meral lifc
- clcarly cslahlishcd hy British seapowcr only in. Ihc 19th ('('ntury and already subjcct to ('ontinual ('rosion m~
state intcrests and constcllations of
pOWl'r haw drastically ehan~ed. Thul'.
while all states pay lipscrvicc to the
do('trine of freedom of Ihe scas hy not
claiming cxpress tcrritorial rights 10
the high seas, they aceomplish close to
thl' saml' )"csult hy thl'ir ~rowing numh('r of claims to paramount national
('ontrol of many of the uses of the high
sca~. Thl' many lypl'S of so·callcd ('XC('Ptions whi('h havc dcvl'loped - for exampll" Ill<' ('xpallsion of tl'rrilorial
wall'rs. law I'nfon·(,lIll'lIt. anel fishinl!
contip:uous ZOIlI'S; claims to III(' (:olllinI'ntal shelves; rlaims 10 I'xdusin' atomic'
wcapons and missil(~ testin/! arcas; perhaps ('ven tIl(' Cuhan quarantinc -

mar 1)(' arp:lH'd to 1)(' pro/!rcssiVl'ly <11'\'ourillp: tIl(' rlll<,. Whilt, il is tnl<' Ihat
jH'a(,l'ful nayip:alion an<l fi~hing righls
arc thus far rl'~pcetcd. WI' must still ask
how frce thc sl'as really arc toelay.
Third. in vi('W of the jurisdictional
significallcc of the eoncl'pt of tl'rritory.
il is imporlanl for our pllrpOSCS 10
know l'onH'lhill;! ahoul Ihl' 1'II11'1' II hi('h
an' ar~IH'd to !!0\"('1"Il ..tailll~ by I'arioll"
~Iale~ In pn'l·inm. l~ IIl1approprial('d or
ulI('la i lIll'd a rea,,; IIIl' II'!!al .ia r~oll f(ll"
:,-uch unclaimed arcas is tl'rm IIl1l1ill.,
or "no OI1l"S land." Early Icgal doctrin<'
tended to rcco~ni7.(' ml're discovl'ry of
such lands and symholic acls, such as
planting lhl' flag and formal drclaralion, as sufficicnl to ground a valid titlr.
But by the late 19th ccntury states such
as thc United States were insisting that
something more was. needed socallcd e[('ctive occupation. Undl'r this
doclrine the validity of a Slate's claim
to titlc to terra nullius and to consC'qucnt rulemaking authority with rcspcct to it was dcpendcnt upon that
statc's dl'monstrating that it was, in
fact, capahle of cxcrcisinl!: continuous
I!:ovcrnml'ntal functions in that area. It
was argucd Ihat in rclurn for intcrnalional )"eeognition of ils claim hy olhcr
~Ialt'~. a I'laimanl ~hould Iw in a posilion 10 pro\('('t tlH' nalionals and IllI' in1I'l'I1alional rip:hl~ of tho:-:t' ollH'r ~tal<'s
in the area in question. However, whil"
the grncral standard of c{fcctive occupatioll rt'('eivrd gcncral approval, Hev<'ral international dccisions - notably
thosl' in Ihc Palm as I$land. Clipperton
Isla lid, and Eastern Greenlalld e1lS('Shavc since sup;~ested lhat wherc the
pI'I'viously unclaiml'd an'a is inhos·
pitahl(' and largt'ly IIninhahitl'(1 quill'
minimal activitirs may mcct the standal'll of ('[('('Iiv!' O(·I'upalion. Thus. IIII'
pn'('i~(' rl'lJuin'lIH'nls of IIH' t'IT('('liv('
oC('upalion rul<' in <IifT('fin~ ('onlt'xls is
far from (·It'ar.
Of (·ollrs!'. l'il\('(' hy tlH' 20th ('('nlury
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0:;1 ~il!n i fiC'anL a n'a~ of til!' worlel wer('
aln·ady firmly (lc('upit'c1 ano dainll'c1.
or. in till' C'a~(' of 111(' high ~('as. con:-:icl(·r!·el not [('rret nullius hut res com11/1ll/is nol suhject to claim - th('
prohl('ms until r('c('ntly s('emed of mon'
Ilworrtical than practical il!lportance.
Bul now th('s(' c1oclril\('s anel prt'('('cknts
011'1' a!!aill Ill'ill~ ilwokl'(1. An' 11\l' 111'\\'
"11\ ilolln\l'nls 10 I... rl'~!anll"d a-- rt·.~
/"(III/II/ullis. likl' IllI' high "l'as. illl"apahh'
of approprialion? Or an' Ihl'y ('rm
lIullius. :,ubjt'('1 10 ('!aim'? :\nd. if (,'rra
I/llllius, what sort and dcgree of activity
is sufficirnt to Irgitimatc such exclusive
claims?
Let's now look at these different environments and the legal regimes or
problems which have emerged.
III

The Arctic. The North Polar region presents the simplest problem
from the standpoint of international
law. It is, of course, a vast ocean almost completely surrounded by the
North American, Asian, and European
contin('nts and by the Island of Greenland. Only the northern fringes of the
continents, Greenland, and some scattered harren islands offer a solid platform for human habitation or exploitation. Although some one million people
live within the Arctic Circle and the
Arctic has considerable potential living
and mineral resources, the actual ex·
ploitation of the area is presently limited. On the other hand, the geographic
position of the North Polar region and
its potential use as a highway makes it
of great strategic and commercial significance, for the shortest air and sea
routes between the world's most densely
populated, economically advanced, and
militarily powerful countries pass
through the North Polar region. For
commercial aircraft, Jmbmarines, and
missiles alike, the Polar route is the
quickest way between Europe and Asia
and North America. The feasibility of
submarine navigation beneath the

polar ice was demonstrated when the
Nautilus reached the North Pole in
1958. It is worth noting that a sub·
marine traveling under the polar ice
from London to Tokyo needs to 'travel
only about half the distance of present
surface ships. The Soviet Union has
devoted considerable effort ~o Arctic
activities and has developed a northern
!'ea route acro!'s Ih(' top of Asia which
it announc('d last March would be open
to foreign ships on a toll basis; however, it is reported tha~ only one Russian commercial vessel has so far used
the route and this for ,demonstration
purposes.
As to the Arctic Ocean itself, there
s('rms to be general agreement that the
traditional law of the sea is fully
applicable. This result is not surprising,
in view of the clearly oceanic character
of the area, the strength of the legal
precedents involved, the limited possihility of exercising exclusive control,
and the traditional shared inter('st of
all neighboring countries in nonexclusive access to the r('gion's principal use
as a highway. From the time that the
United States politely declined to endorse Admiral Peary's purported annexation of the North Pole until the
present, there appears to have bren
broad agreement that neither the Arctic Ocean itself nor, in particular, the
pack of floating jce upon it are capable
of exclusive national appropriation.
United States and Soviet aircraft, icebreakers, submarines, and United
States and Soviet scientific parties
hased on floating ice Boes have, on
many occasions, transited the Arctic
Ocean without protest.
A very recently reported incident
hoth evidences this general principle
and at the same timn indicates the
special l('gai problems which may
nevertheless emerge. This summer two
U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers, Edisto
and Eastwind, undertook the first cir-
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cum navigation of the Arctic Ocean and
proceeded with most of their voyage
without protest from any state. Their
route was planned so as to pass well
outside any state's territorial waters.
However, in late August the ships were
blocked by heavy ice in the Kara Sea
and the United States, through our
Moscow Embassy, informed the Sovie>ts
that the ships woulo have 10 pass
through Vilkitski Strait, which lie>s between the Soviet island of Severnaya
Zemlya and the Chelyuskin Peninsula
of Siberia and comlC'cts the Kara and
Laptev Seas. The Soviet Government
took the position that such passage
would violate Soviet frontiers stating
that, since it claims a 12-mile territorial
zone, the 22-mile-wide straits arc
wholly Soviet waters. Faced with
Soviet objections and the consequent
impossibility of proceeding, the United
States cancelled the expedition. However, we sent a stiff note of protest to
the Soviets, pointing out that the Russian action appeared to be a violation
of the innocent passage provision of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, that the ships presented no
threat to the security and peace of the
coastal state, and that the Russians had
frustrated a useful scientific endeavor
and deprived the international community of research data of considerable
significance.
Let me offer a brief comment. It is
true that article 16 (4) of the Territorial Sea Convention provides a right of
innocent passage "through straits
which are used for international navigation between one part of the high
seas and another part of the high seas."
Moreover, the International Court in
the 1949 Corfu Channel case had proclaimed a right of innoce>nt passage>
through such straits, eve>n as to naval
vessels, as a matter of customary international law. The Court, in thal case,
n'je>ete>d the argument that the passage

in question must he a "ne>cessary" one
and held that the convenience of the
Corfu Strait for international navigation and the substantial use made' of
the strait for that purpose were sufficient to place it in the' category of an
"international highway." Scholarly dehale on the Vilkitski Strait incident will
probably turn on the intere'sting question of whe>the>r the Vilkitski Strait can
really he ("onsidereo one used for "international navigation" or as an "international highway" within the meaning
of the Convention and Corfu Channel
casco On the one hand, no United
States vessel and few Soviet or other
vessels appear to have previously transited the Strait. On the other hand, the
Strait apparently is part of the Sovirtproclaimed northern sea route>. Of
course, Soviet sensitivity to potential
espionage may well have played a part
in this incident. But note that despite
this unhappy occurrence the Soviet
Government made no claim to restrict
navigation of the vessels outside its
territorial waters.
Legal problems of the Arctic have,
for the most part, involved territorial
claims to the various northern islands_
For instance, Denmark's claim to
Greenland by discovery and occupation was confirmed by the International
Court in the Eastern Greenland case.
Norway holds Spitzbergen under the
terms of an interesting multilateral
treaty of 1925 which, in some of its
demilitarization and open-access proV1SlOns, anticipates the Antarctic
Treaty. And there has been some controversy over Russian claims to
Wrangel Island.
But perhaps the most interesting territorial issue concerns the so-called sector daims advanced hy Canada in ] 907
and tIll! Sovie>t Union in 1926. Undl'r
this sl'('\or tlH'ory. thl'sl' eOlllltrh's dnim
title to all An·tie islands lying IlI'twl'('n
the>ir northern eontirll'nlnl mainltllllls
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and tlJ(' North Poh' situated within the
mrridians of their most rasterly and
Wl'Stl'r1y continrlltal boundaries. These
pie.shaped srctor claims are basrd on
a rather far-reaching theory of con·
tiguity and do not depend on actual
discovery or occupation. None of the
four othrr nations which border on the
Arctic Ocran - Norway, Finland, the
{initrc\ Statl's (by virtue of Alaska),
lind D('nmark (by virtue of Grernland)
- r('ro~nizr Ih(' srrtor principle or
have made claims based on that principle. Howevrr, in practice, in view of
thr pn'srntly limitrd utility of the Arctic islands invol\'('d, the ~rctor·c1aim
rontro\'('rsy, though unresol\'('d. has
hrrn of more theoretical than practical
importance.
One othrr recent devrlopment perhaps dr~rrvr~ hrief ml'ntion - Presidrnt Ei~rnhower's 1958 "oprn skies"
propo~al for thr rstablishment of an
Arctic intrrnational in~peetion zone to
~uard against surprise attack. Of
coursr, this proposal came to naught
when it was vrtoed hy the Sovirt Union
in thc Unitrd Nations Security Council.

The Antarctic. The South Polar
rrgion is, for our purposes, much more
int('rr~tinA'.
Antarctica prrsent~ a
stron~ rontra~t to thr Arctir ~co·
graphically. ~tratcgiral\y. and from thr
standpoint of thr legal prohlrll1s in·
volved. It consists principally of a vast
and drsolatr ice·coverrd continent, as
large as thr United States and Europe
comhiIwd, surrounded on every side by
thou~ancls of miles of hazardous occan,
ice·filled and impassahle in thr winter
months. This continent is the coldest,
drirst. windirst, anel most harrl'n land
on rarth. Antarctica itself supports vir·
tually no native animals or plants,
though th(' offshore watl'rs of thl' An·
tarctic convrr~rnce tl'rm with sea lif('.
and prnguins and othrr hirds nl'st on
the' Antarc·tic coasts. Rrfor(' tIl(' ('nd of

World War II only a handful of human
hl'ings had Sl't foot on thr continent,
and ('\'('n fewrr had staYl'd through the
long and harrowing Antarctic wintrr.
The economic valul' of Antarctica is
miniscule. No significant mineral eleposits or other natural rcsourccs have
thus far hcpn di~('ovrrrd; in any cvcnt.
posts of rxploiting and transporting any
dis('on'rirs would prohahly hr prohihi.
ti\"('. Othrr usrs whirh ha\'r hrrn suA'w's\rd - for rxamplr. tourism or usc
of thr ('ontinl'nt as a vast ('oM stora!!1'
wan'hou~r ~I'rm unlikely to hc important in the ncar futUre. Moreover,
in view of the remotcness of the contin!'nt from significant population
ccntNs and thr fact that the most im·
portant world powrrs lie in the North('TIl rather than the Southern Hemi·
sphere, Antarctica appears to have little
potrntial value as a route for transpolar
air traffic and little strategic significance. Thus, it is difficult to see that
Antarctica naval hases or missile sites
would really be of much practical use
to any country. In practice, the principal importance of the continent has
heen in thc area of scientific research,
as a vast laboratory of vital importance
to a grrat numh!'r of scientific discipIin('s.
The limitrd usrfulness of the Antarrt ir has strongly influenrcd prrsent
intl'rnational treatment of the prohlem
of territorial and jurisdictional claims.
From the time that the existence of
Antarctica was established in the early
1800's, a number of countries showed
an intere'st in the area, and by 1956
sPv('n countries had made extrnsive territorial claims covering altogether some
80 prrcrnt of the continent. These territorial claims, hased primarily on
discovery, symbolic acts, and limited
t('mporary activitie's hy small expeditions, w('re in many cases conflicting.
Muny of thci'e countries rrfusrd to
rt'l:ogniz(' ('uch other's claimi'. The
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lInil('d Slall'~, drspilr its own very extensive activities in the Antarctic,
n('ithrr made territorial claims itself in
Antarctica nor recognized such claims
by othrrs. The traditional U.S. position
was that by its very nature the Antarctic was incapable of that degree of
rfft'rlive occupation sufficient to support snch claims of territorial sover(,ignty. Thc SO\'irt Union." which hr('amI' increasingly activr in Antarctira
following World War II, also refusrd
to r('rogni7.(, oth('r statrs' daim~ to trrritory. The r('suIt was lrgal chaos.
The lcgal qurstions involved became
practically significant only in the middlr 1950's. The International Geophysical Year 1956-58 rrsultrd in a major
invasion of the continrnt by thousands
of scientists and supporting military
and technical personnel of more than
a dozen countries. This invasion has, in
the last 10 years, become a conqurst.
By now advanced trchnology has made
possible the construction by somr 11
states of over 30 permanent stations
throughout the Antarctic, including the
United States McMurdo, Byrd, South
Pole, and other stations, and the Soviet
Vostok and Mirnyy stations. Developments in sra and airborne logistic support havr madr possihlr widr-ranging
rrsrarch acti"itirs and largr-scale continuing supply of thrse installations; in
faet, I nndrrstand Ihat the United
States has this season instituted
schrduled winter flights hetween New
Zealand and McMurdo station - a
considrrahle technical achievement in
virw of the extremr winter conditions.
A nurlear reactor is in operation at
MrMurdo station and others an' contemplatc(l. Th(' total Antarctic ~ummrr
population may 1I0W numb('r over
2.000 prr~ons and til(' winlt'r population ov('r 700 - hardly a mrlropolis.
but c('rtainly a community.
With dl'\'(·lopn1!'nts 011 this sl'all'_
('ollpl('d with Ill(' IJ('('(J:.; of sci('ntists for

frce acc('ss to rvrry part of th(' Antan'tic for thrir rest'arch, the problem of
national territorial claims for the first
time hrcamr trouhlcsomr. A modus
vivendi was established during the ICY
itst'lf under which daimant states
avoided intrrfering with each othrr's
activitirs evrn if they occurrrd within
daiml'd trrritory. Howrvl-r, when it
Iwcamr rddl'nt after the IGY that
substantial activitirs would he continuing indrfinitely_ a morr stahlr Irgal
arrangemrnt hrcanw drsirahh'.
Following U.S. initiatin' and cardul
advance prrparation, a conference of
the 12 countries most involvrd in the
Antarctic activitirs was held in 1959
in Washington. This conferrnce drew
up the Antarctic Treaty which rnterrd
into forcr in 1961. The original parties
wrre Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
South Africa, the Soviet Union, the
Unitt'd Kingdom, Ih(, Unit(-d Stall-s,
and Poland. C7.echoslovakia, Denmark.
land the Netherlands have since
acceded.
The Treaty is a remarkable international achievement representing, in my
view, a sensible and practical solution
to the problC'ms countries arr jointly
('onfrontrd with in AntarctiC'a. The
Tr('aty, which is hinding upon the
partiC's for at lrast ~O yC'ars, is applirahl(' to th(· ar('a south of latitude GO°
S., including all icc shelves; however,
rights under international law respecting thl' high seas are not affected. The
area is both demilitarized and made a
nuclear-free zonr. Military activitirs of
any nature, nurlear C'xplosions, and the
disposal of radioactivr wastes arc prohihitl'd. howrv('r, military )lrr~onnrl
and (,quipmcnt can be used to supJlort
srit'ntific rrsearch, and nuclear relwlors lIIay 1)(' II Iii i?;('(I. To ltssllrl'
ohSt'r\'<IlH'(' of tl\('l'(, provision~, Ih('f('
is a p:tlh-hn'akill~ arlirlt' ill lIlt' Tn'tll),
p('rll1illill~ (,Olllplt·h' fn·(-dom of insp(,('-
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tioll; allY party may at allY time
unilatrrally carry out inspections by
ground or by aerial surveillance anywhl're in the Treaty area. The United
States, in fact, conducted such inspections, including inspections of Soviet
stations, in 1964 and 1967, and various
othrr countries followed suit - although the Soviet Union has not yet
dOllr ~o. Whill'. of coursr. thl' Treaty
dOl'S not hind nonpartit's. the partks
IInd('rtak(' "to (,XNt appropriate dTorts,
con::,istrnt with th(' Charh'r of thr
l'nitl'd Nations, to the ('nd that no onr
rn~ag('s in any activity in Antarctica
contrary to thl' principles of thr
Trl'aty." Since the major world pOWl'rs
are partirs, it is unlikely that nonpartil's would fail to respect the legal
rl'gime the Treaty creatl's.
A major prohlem for thr Treaty
drafters was, of course, that of territorial claims and jurisdiction. Even
though the practical importance of
th(' areas claimed was slight, the rmotional significancr of such claims to
ccrtain of the claimant countries was
gr('at. Consl'qurntly, proposals for com·
plrte intrrnationalization of Antarctica,
or at lrast the estahlishment of an international authority to provide rules for
the arra, proved impracticable. On the
other hand. a final determination of the
many compl'ting positions on claims
was cll'arly even more out of the question. The course taken by the Treaty
drafters was therefore to bypass this
complex issue and to dl'al instead with
the practical asp('cts of sovrrrignty
rather than its theoretical structure.
Thus, the Trl'aty says nothing ahout
the validity of existing claims. Instead,
it freezes existing positions as they
were in 1961 and establishes a morato·
rium on new claims while the Treaty is
in force. Nothing done by any country
in Antarctica while the Treaty is in
forcl' is to aITl'ct thl' validity of such
claims onr way or the other. On th('

other hand, the most practically significant incident of such claims, that of
allocating competence to control conchlct, is handlea by providing that observers carrying on inspections under
the Treaty, and also exchange scientists,
are to he subject only to the jurisdiction
of their state of nationality. Other
jurisdictional prohlems are to he resoh'rd hy consultation. Thus. while it
r('mains possihlr for claimant states to
aSSl'rt the right to l'stablish rull's on thl'
basis of territorial sovrrl'ignty, and
many have enactl'd laws purportin~ to
do i'0. most staLes have in practice restrictrd thl' application of such rules
to thl'ir own nationals. Note that so long
as jurisdictional rights are restricted
by thl' agreement the issues of territorial claims remain largely theoretical.
While no formal international organization is established by the Treaty, it
provides for extensive scientific cooprration and exchange of information
and for periodic meetings of the
parties. The participants in these meetings may recommend to their governmrnts so-called agreed measures implementing Treaty purposes, and these
rrcommendations, when unanimously
approved hy thl' parties, are internationally binding. The extent of coopl'ration among the parties has been
remarkable. Important agreed measures
havr been approved covering problems
of conservation, telecommunications,
and scientific cooperation.
The SUCCl'SS thus far of the Antarctic Trraty in a world of cold war and
other conflicts is worth noting. A cynic
might suggest that one reason the
Trl'aty could be concluded and has
worked so well is that Antarctica is
rather useless except for scientific
research. Scientific research is a use
which by its very nature stimulates coopl'ration and is hostile to the concepts
of ('xclusin' rulrmaking authority and
rri'trict('d accrss implicit in l('rrilorial
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sovereignty. As in thc casc of thc common interest in free navigation of thc
high seas, the mutual advantages to
states of common access for all to all
areas clearly far outweigh those any
single state can gain by unduly press·
ing its own separate interests. Moreover, the drafters wisely bypassed the
difficult and cmotional theoretical is·
SII(,S of It'rritorial claims and srttled inst('ad the practical functional issues
necessary to permit the work of scicntific research to go on.
Thlls, in terms of our concern with
thr question of who makes thc rulrs,
whatrver the Antarctic may he in legal
tlwory, it appears in pr('sent pracliee
milch like the high seas - a res communis - with each nation controlling
its own expeditions and nationals. What
might happen under changed circumstances where states find a real stake
in exclusive claims - for cxample, if
valuable mineral deposits arc dis·
covercd - remains to be seen. Hopefully thc habits of cooperation and
functional solution engendered hy thr
Treaty would engender equally sensible
new ways of dealing with such devrlop.
ments.
As you may know, the success of thl'
Antarctic Treaty stimulated thr cIt'yelopment of the United Nations Outer
Space Treaty which was largely
modeled on it. However, the Outrr
Space Treaty, of course, foreclosrs thr
incipient problem of territorial claims
by specifically barring such claims in
outer space and providing that it is
to be free for the usc of all.
Thus, reasonably workahle solutions
have emerged for handling the presrnt
iegal problems of the polar regions
and outrr space - solutions analogous
to thosc devrIoped in the last century
for thr high sras.
The Deep Seas. But when wr turn
to the deep seas, the prohlrms hrC'omt'

more trouhlt'somr. For hrTl' we an' not
talking about harrC'n areas of limited
practical vallH'. arras in which national
inteTl'sts are primarily in thr inhrrently
common and sharahlt' usrs of tran~il
and scirnlific inn'stigation. Jnst('ad. WI'
arc d('aling with an emrrging world of
trem('ndous potential wealth and sig.
nificancr, on(' in which the rewards of
('"clusive accrss ancI jurisdiction may
appl'ar n')"), tC'mJltin~ to stal('s. Sin('t'
I IIndersland Admiral H('arn will II('
diseussin~ Ihis SUhjl'ct in cIt'lail in a
lalt'1" Il'ctur('. J will limit IIlY~I'lf 10
sketching out the ollllin('s of tIlt' pro\!·
lrm.
Again tl)('se qllt'stions aris(' from tlIt'
striking d(w('lopmt'nls in It'l'hnology
whieh have incrt'asingly permitted
man's penetration beneath the seas a technology which has had to over·
come the obstacles of an environment
prrhaps more akin to that on thc surface of a neighboring planet than on
the surface of our own earth - airless,
wet, cold, opaque, and corrosive, with
rxtremc pressur('s. You arc prohably
familiar with many of ti)('S(' develop·
ments. We see broad advances in the
trchnology of marine mining and
marinc structures which have permittt'd maint('nance of fixed and s('miprrmallt'nt marine installations and III!'
commercial extraction of oil and othl'r
r('sources from th(' seabed and subsoil.
The nuclear submarine is a basic foundation of our modern Navy. More than
20 tethered or free· moving manned
drrp sea submergence systems have
been developed for research, rescur,
and recovery, and we are gaining new
experience with remote control underwater manipulator or robot systems as
that used for the recovery of the nuclear bomb off Spain. Other develop.
nwnts include surface and d('('p oeran
hlloy tt'chnology capahle of recorcling
and tdrmeterin~ information to ship,
shor(', or ~ateJJjt(· inslallations; im·
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I'rov('c1 ehartillg or the' dl'(,p l'l'as and
Iheir ('urrl'nts; and navigational and
Jlol'itional tt'chnology permitting location_ idl'ntification_ and relation to
ohjr('lg in thr undl'rs('a rnvironnll'nt.
Finally. thrre art' various trdmologi1.'al advances prrmitting human beings
10 lin' and work as frer swimmers unc1<'r5ras. as illustrated by scuba systems
ancl l'aturation diving trchniqucs, thr
Na\'y'l' "Mun in III(' Sl'a" program and
Spala" r. IT, ancl I If rX(lc'rim('ntl'. ancl
1'IilI ('arl), rc'l'par('h on "artificial ~ilk"
,nIh 11\('5r IIch·an('rs hal' cmnr II Irl'IIIl'lIdou;; UpgUrgl' ill awan'I\l'::s of Ihl'
potrntial importance and riches of the
marinr cnvironment.
Thus, the development of the Polaris
undersea weapons system, with its
virtues or concealmcnt, mobility, and
dil'persion, has dearly greatly affected
stratc'gic thinking; in fact, in June
1966 thr Pand on Oceanography of the
Pre!';drnt's Scirncr Advisory Committrr statrd that "thr most urgrnt aspect
of Fc'clc'ral involvemrnt in ocran sciencr
and technology for the next 5 to 10
years relates to national security in the
narrow, strictly military srnse."
Again, in an age in which thl' threat
of overpopulation has hrcome a prolllrm rivaling that of nuclear weapons
and in which som(' ohl'rrvt'rs prt'dict a
collapsr of tht' world's food economy
within 20 years_ the possibility of incrt'asing utilization of the vast and
thus far largrly unrxploited potential
food rrsourct's of the seas has acquired
grt'at significance. Some believe our
ability to dt've1op marine sources of
food may he indispensable to the maintrnance of long run world social, economie, and political stability.
The great mineral wealth of the sea
- oil, coal, sulfur, iron, manganese,
and diamonds and as a source for
desalinated water - is being increasingly exploited with potentially important eITects on a number of national

economics. For example, in addition
to the rapic! dt'vdopmrnt of ofTshorr
oil and mineral extraction in thc
United Statrs. important cnergy
sources are bring developed in the
North Sea, and Australia, among other
countries, has discovered important offshore mineral deposits.
Tht' advanlagrs of large cargo submarinrs, frrl' or surface wind and
weather. operating. for ('xample. undrr
tl\(' Arctic ice between Europe and
Asia have brrn pointed out. WI' have
IH'gun to appreriatC' Ihr potrntially
profound rfTt'cts of our growing pollution of the oceans - a problem dramatized by the Torre Canyon incident and
the question of disposal of radioactive
waste. Finally, the possible uses of the
OCt'aIl'S tides for power, as in the proposed Passamaquoddy Dam project,
and tIll' grC'at eITect of the oceans on
weather and the problem of weather
control arc being explored.
Even a bricf survcy of these developments suggt'sts a science-fiction future
where man's food comes largely from
ocean algae farms, whale herds, and
fish ranges "fenced" by bubble' or
sonic harriers, where national security
is hascd on underwater submarine or
missile hast'S, perhaps constantly
shiftrd ahout the ocean floor to a\·oid
dett'ction; wht'rc mt'n may ultimately
e,·en live and work in cities beneath
the sea.
This ncw significanct' of the 'ocean
is, in turn, forcing a reassessment by
states of their national interests and
attitudes - a reassessment perhaps
symbolizt'd in our own country by
Congressional passagc last year of the
Marinc Resourcrs and Engineering Development Act and the fact that, by
my information, over 15 intragovernmental committees are now working on
ocean development prohlems. Whilc the
sea was principally viewed as a highway. thc doctrine of freedom of the
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sC'as, of nonexclusive use, had a broad
appeal. ThC' national interest {'aeh stat{'
had in frC'1' navigation of tlw sC'as hy
its own ships without interf{'rC'nre by
oth{'r countries gem'rally outweighed
the limited gains a state might hope to
derive from its own assertion of exclusive control on the seas. However,
whrr{' nonsharable or competing uses
dC'\'l'lop - as wilh the exploitation of
mitwral wC'alth or fish{'ril's - a strong
national int{'rest in asserting paramOllnt or exclusivC' control of these
1lii'C'S I'II1{'rgl's. Mor{'ovC'r, whC'fl' the
potential eff{'cts of high s{'as activity
on shore states hecome more significant or are more profoundly realized
- as with the prohl{'m or unders{'a
Wl'apons systems or polllltion-pr{'ssure
to protect national interests hy assC'rting authority on the high seas mounts.
One illustration of this tendency is,
of course, the many attempts by statrs
to control fishing in their offshore high
seas waters, for example, our own P.L.
89-658, enacted last year, asserts the
right of the UnitC'd States to control
fishing in a contiguous zone 9 miles
out from the limits of our t{'rritorial
sea. But more significant for our purpose are developments concerning the
continental shelf.
The real takeoff of this development
was our own Truman Declaration of
1945 which proclaimrd that the United
States regards the natural rl'sources of
the suhsoil and s{'alll'd of thl' contigIIOUS continental shl'lf as appertaining
to the United States and suhject to its
jurisdiction and control. While a t{'rritorial claim to the shelf was deliberatd}" avoided and it was made clear
rights of navigation in thl' superjac{'nt
seas wen' not aff{'cted, our assertion of
jurisdiction over the shelf itself was
\"ery far-reaching. The U.S. declaration
was follow{'d in !'hort order hy similar
declarations hy many othrr stat{'s with
continental slw\v{'s. Finally, in 1958.

tIl(' principle of allocating virtually {'xc\u!'i,,{' rights to th{' u~{' of rrsources
of the rontill{'ntal ~hdf to the contiguous shore statl' was, in rffrr!. ratifird
hy thr Grneva COllwntion on tIl{' Con·
tinC'ntal Shelf to whirh some RO statC's
arr now party.
Unckr the ContinC'ntai Sh{'lf Con\'C'ntion Ih{' coastal state eXl'rci~C's sovC'rI'i:rn ri:rhts o\'C'r tIl(' rontirwnlal slwlf
for Ihl' plIl'po!'e of I'xploring it alHI 1'\ploilin!! il:, nalural 1'e1'O\l1'('I'1'. \I0WI'\'I'I'.
Illl'>:e righl>: do nol afTI'd thl' 1I'!!al
!'lalll1' of Ill\' !'IIPI'1'j:H'1'1l1 \I all'1'>: a:;
high s{'as or thaI of Ilw ail'sparl' ullll\ ('
waters, The rights to the resources of
thl' shelf do not depend on occupation
or expr('~s proclamation and are exc\usiv<, in th{' sen~e that if thr coastal
state does not explore the continental
shl'lf or exploit its natural r('somcrs no
onc I'ls<' may und('rtake these activities
or make a claim to the continental shelf
without the expressed consent of the
coastal state, The com,tal state may not
unjustifiahly intl'rfere with navigation,
fishing, or the conservation of living
r('sources of the sea, or scientific research. However, the coastal state is
entitled to install and maintain or
operate on the continental shelf installations and other devices necessary for
the exploration and exploitation of its
natural resources and may establish
safety zones around such installations,
not to exceed 500 meters in hreadth.
Th(· n('gotiating history of th{' Convention sUl!g<'sts that there is no clear
har to the placement of defense installalions on the continental shelf hy the
shore state.
It is important to note that the definition of continental shelf given in the
Convention is not what a geologist's
definition might be (assuming geologists could agree) and is specifically
oprn <'nded; it is defined as "the sea
b<,d and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjac<'nt to thl' coast .. , to a depth of
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200 mrl('rs or. heyond that limit, to
whC'rt, tl\(, d('pth of the superjaccnt
wa!t'rs admit of the exploitation of the
natural rrsources." Thus, while the
Convention establishcs a reasonably
d('ar regime for the continental shelves
thrmsrlves, giving rulemaking author·
ity to the coastal statc, it is left unclear
prrrisrly wherr that sort of rcgime
rnel::;. Pre::;lImahly such exdu!;ivr claims
It n' :rood ai- h'a::;t ::;omr e!islatlCl' hl'yone!
1111' 20()·1l1l'1I'r linl' or "lsI' 1111' "I'xploilnhilit y.' C'rill'ria wouldn't hav(' hrrl1
addl'l!. On 1111' ollll'r hand. a ("onn'nlion
d('alin~ wilh Ihe coulinl'nlal slH'1f ('ouhl
not easily hc argued to resolve quc::;tiOIl!; of jurisdiction in zones having
littlC' rrlal ion to the continrntal shC'lf.
particularly wll('Tl' the alternativc 200·
mrtrr drpth was provided.
Since drilling ean now be done in as
much m; 1,000-foot depths and thc
Unitl'cl Statl's has already leasee! min·
C'ral rights in arC'as of drpths of over
'1.0(H) f('('1 - dl'vrlopmrnts not for('seen
hy the draftC'rs of the Convcntion trouhlC'some probl('m!; of interpr('tation
ar(' aln'ue!y arising. An intC'r('!;ting examplr of Ihi::; prohll'm i::; the n'portee!
rre('nt attrmpt by some San Dirgo
hu::;itl('ssmrn to estahlish thr so-callre!
n('w nation of Ahalonia. The plan was
to ('stahlish an artificial island by sinking a ('on('r('tc reinforcrd ship in 12
(rrt of watt'r· on Cortrs Bank. which
1iC'::; 110 mill'S off San DiC'go. The issu('
arOSl' wlll'tlll'r U.S. authority une!C'r thl'
contitl('ntal sheff legislation extended to
tIl(' hank, sincc tIl(' water between the
hank ane! thC' mainland rrached depths
of over 1,100 meters. Unfortunately for
Irftal scholarship, a storm drove the
ship off tIl(' hank and it sank in deep
watcr, so the question is still open. As
another illustration of these developing
problems, last March Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands submitted
to the World Court a dispute hetwern
thrm ('onceming thr delimitation of

thr eontin!'ntal sh!'1f of the North Sea.
Assuming thnt the Contin('ntal Shrlf
Convrntion is limited to at least the
morc shallow areas of thr s('as adjacrnt
to the continrnts, we arc still faced with
the qurstions of where the precise limit
of thr regime of the .continental shdf
is and who may establish rules for
a('livities in the deep sea heyond those
shallow rrgions. We may soon srI) thi!;
prohlt'm raisC'd in a nuil'ly of prartieal
cont('xts. For ('xample:
Could the Unitrd Stales pro·
hihit or control thc activitirs of
an English or somc other foreign
company seeking to extract minrrals from the scahrd or subsoil
just b('yond the limits of our
gC'ologicalIy defined Atlantic conlilH'ntal shelf and at greater than
200 mC'ter drpths?
What about Russian construction of an undersea missile basc
just outsidC' our shrlf or, for that
matter, its permanent stationing
of a fie!'t o[ missile submarines in
our offshore waters?
If it (I.S. company discovers
and begins C'xploitation of the
resources of a seamount in the
mid-Atlantic, i~ there any way it
can prevent other U.S. or foreign
rompanirs from rushing in to
shan' its find - for. clearly, if
sOl11e ml'asure of exclusivity is
not possible, ~uch C'xploration
and development may not be
commerciall y feasible?
What crlminal and private
laws wiII regulate the conduct of
individuals on U.S. or foreign
fixed installations on or under
the high seas? For example, suppose a U.S. scuba diver kills a
French scuba diver in the process
of !;!'('king discoverir.!; beneath
the high ~('as?
How will tIll' iJ1('vitahle confljets hrtween thC' traditional usrs
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of til!' s('a for navigation and
fishing and the various new undrrseas uses hE' resolved ? For instance, can a Texas tower hc built
or a fixed or free-floating buoy
system put in operation even
though they may create hazards
to ships? It is interesting to note
that in thc GuJ£ of Mexico it has
prowd lll'('essary to estahlish
Shipping Safl·ty Fairways to
avoid dangers of ('olIision with
sm·h permanent installations.
IIow can a country stop another country from taking one of
its huoys or extracting its information?
What ahout damage to fishing
eaused by pollution or other hyproducts from undersea mining
activities?
Can the United States restrict
trawling, the disposal of radioactive materials, or undcrwater
C'xplosions in til(' vicinity of U.S.
opC'rated subsurface installations,
and can it enforce such regulations against foreign nationals?
What if a government or pri,'ate individuals use modern technology to herd fish from the high
seas into exclusive contiguous
fishing zones?
And so on! As we have seen, there are
various approa('h('s onc could take to
provide solutions for thC's(! prohlelm;.
First, we could say that all of the
high seas, including its depths, bed,
and suhsoil r('main res communis anel
open to all with no possibility of unilateral claims to exclusivc usc; cons('qucntly, ('ach statl' will typically control only its own nationals, enterprises,
or installations. Ohviously, assuming
that such a doctrin(' wonld still lPgally
p('rmit unilateral ('xploitation to he
carri('d on, it would still appear to furnish litth' protection to nations or
finns initiating mining or other de-

wlopnl!'ntal activiti('s; as soon as th('
dp\"dopnwnt showpd promisp, poarlH'rs
might com(' in. Hational planning of
deep spas usps would he impossihl('
without soni(' ovt'rruling intrrnational
undl·rstandings.
S('col1<l, we could extend the contin('ntal slwH principle to the oc('an dl'(,ps.
elidding rights on SOIll(' sort of sl'('tor
Ih('ory I)('t\\'('('n littoral slat(·s. Bul slll'h
diyil:ipn ha~('d on a('dd('nls of !!;(·ogra·
phy n'aHy unn·lall'd to rpal ('onsid('raI-ions of contiguity would hI' highly
inequitablC' and extremely complC'x.
States whom geography did not favor
would cC'rtainly not accept it.
Third. WI' could say that th(' hed and
suhsoil of tlw dl'l'll ocC'an is /rrra 1lullius - whorvcr can e/TI·(·tivdy ('xploit
and ('ontrol it ('an claim l'xdusivl!
rights. This doctrinC', of course, would
\t'ad to que·stions as to what constitull'd
such e/Tertivc occupation and possibly
a racl' I)(·tw(·rn thr United Statrs, the
SO\'ipt lin ion. and thr f('w othrr t('('hno logically capable statC's to graIl the
depths for thrmselves. Prrsidcnt Johnson voiced this concern last year when
he warned: "Under no circumstances
... must we ever allow the prospects of
rich harvest and mineral wealth to
create a new form of colonial competition among thE' maritime nations. We
must he careful to avoid a race to
gra::p and to hold thr lands undrr th('
high s('as. We nlll::;l in::un' that the
deep S('as and the oc('an bottoms are,
and rrmain, tIl{' lrgacy of all human
IJl'ings." Some Government departments may he having second thoughts
about the hreadth of this statement!
Fourth, we could collectively agrer,
as suggested hy last summ('r's World
Pracr Through Law Conference at
G('n('va. I hat till' T('sonrCI'S of thr orl'p
spas "p(,rtain" to tIll' Unit(·d Natiolls
and let th(' Unitrd Nations makr tIll'
applicahlE' rules for the exploitation of
such resources and allocation of their
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helwfitl'. I underl'tand that a proposal
to this ('/T('ct il' Iwing plac('d on the
current U.N. General Assembly agenda.
But do Wt' really place that much eonfid('n("(' in the wisdom of present U.N.
G('nenll Al's(,lllbly majorities? Do we
wllnt to hurden deep s('a d('v('lopm('nt
\\ ith a Unit('c1 Nations hur('aucracy?
Would tlll'r(' he any r('al inc'l'ntive for
cll'\'I'lo(lnll'nt IJIld('r 1'1It'h a l') l'tl'llI'?
Fifth. WI' ("ould dc·\'C'lo(l :111 y 0 f a
\'aridy of pOl'l'ihl(, tY(lI'S of IWW international organizations tailored to m('('t
th(' !'p('cial problems of thc deep l'eal'
and with sj>eciaf rule~aking, adminis·
trativ(', f('gistration, or licrnsing powers to provide for rational development.
For cxample, a statc or a private com·
pany might he granted exclusivt' exploitation rightl' to a Iimit('d an'a upon
r('gist('ring the area with such an international ag('ney and proving its capaci·
ty to actually carry out such exploita.
tion and comply with navigational
saf('ty and pollution standards. The
grante(' might be r('quired to pay a
p('rc('ntage of its profits into a common
international fund for economic developm('nt or other purposes. It is worth
noting that there are already a great
number of international organizations
('np:ag('d in cooperation in the oceanographic fi('ld; for ('xample, th(' International IHnritinl(' Conl'ultativ(' Orp:aniimtion is a('tively !"tudying the Torn!
Cml)wl. pro""'Ill. And, of courl'(" WI'
nlr('ady have conventions in force ap·
plieabl(' to a fl'w of these dr('p !"ea
prohl('ms - for ('xamplt., the Oil Pollution Convention or the 1963 Test Ban
Trenty prohibiting nuclear tests in the
sea.
Finally, we could combine various
approaches, using each to solve the
kinds of problems to which it was brst
suited - for example, letting each
l'tate provide civil and criminal law for
its own installations but perhaps with

international rrgistry of the installa·
tions themselves.
We also ha\'e an additional question
to answer. Should we try to resolve
th('se problems now hy specific international agreelll('nt? Or should WI' in·
stead adopt a go.slow, wait-and·s('e
approach prrmitting th(' probl('ms to
IlI,ltl'r drfine themsrlves h('fore attempting an ov('rall solution. r('stricting ourSI'I \'('s to pral'lica I il'l'ul'!" as tlwy :tris(',
pl'rhaps IPlting answers dl'vdop hy tIl«'
push and pull of national interl'sts de·
veloping into customary law?
This is the shape of the problem,
and, I think, as yet no one really knows
what answers will ultimately be given.
As we'v(' seen, the rules that emerge
will doubtl('ss he some sort of compro·
mil'r, the n'sultant of the interaction of
statc int(,l'l'sts weighted by the influenc(' of the states concerned and their
willingness to exert that influence. But
foreign offices are not yet really sure
where their interests lie in this new
area, so they are reluctant to commit
themselves one way or the other. For
example, at the moment a legal regime
based on the terra nullius concept of
"finders keepers" might seem in the
U.S. interest since our technology appears to give us an edge in any race
for undersea territory. But what of the
Hu:;;.o;ians? And what arc tIle long-term
('osts of su('h an approoeh? Should the
lInitl'd Stat('s s('c'k a rule which pre·
v('nts Sovi('t missile suhs from np'
proaching our own coasts even if the
rule restricts the flexibility of our own
Polaris submarines? As naval offieC'rs,
(10 you rl'al1y have sufficient informa·
tion to now say which rule you would
prefer?
The complexity of these problems is
such that I gladly leave a discussion of
their solution in the more capable
hands of Admiral Hearn. I will restrict
myself to only three comments.
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First, admittedly premature attemptsto deal with ill·defined problems may
be undesirable. However, there seems
to be also a risk in letting the legal
problems of the deep seas drift too long
wilhout ohtaining at least some broad
g('n('ral int('rnational understandings as
to the shape of the legal regime we
contemplate. History suggests that at
some point opposing national interests
and ('ommilmrnts in such matters may
1)('('on1(' ~o f rOlwn Ihat a mutually agree·
nhl(' lIn<1 ralionnl :;olulion i:; no longer
possible. Thus, it can 1)(' argued that
we waited too long in the area of con·
trol of nuclear weapons; conversely,
prrhaps we acted just in time in our
early formulation of the Outer Space
Ti"raty. Against the argument that our
national interest is not yet clear and
do('s not yet permit us to decide what
legal regime for the high seas will
prove most advantageous must be
w('ighed th(' argument that what we can
get now may be better than what will
be possihle later on.
Second, it seems to me unlikely that
the other nations of the world will
acquiesce in a de facto division of the
resources of the high seas among the
few states, such as the United States
and the Soviet Union, now alone
capable of exploring and exploiting
them. I think we will see a growing
«rmand for some form of international
regulation assuring a broader sharing
of tIl(' hrnefits which will flow from
thrse developments - a pressure which
the United States, given the curr('nt
state of international affairs, will find
it hard to n·sist. Thus. it would not he
~urprisillg to -see some broad statement
soon emerge from the U.N. General
Asspmbly rrserving the seabeds and
suhsoil to tIll' use of all mankind and
rxcluding national trrritorial claims a statemrnt based on thr precedent of
the Outer Spacr Declaration and
Treaty. On the other hand, I believe it

highly unlikdy that the gr('at pow('r~
would prest'ntly consent to gin' 10 Ill('
United Nations. or to any similarly
constituted international agency, any
substantial or meaningful oprrational.
control over their deep sea activitirs.
Third, thr most likrly devdopnwnl.
I brlirve, is that we will see a function·
al approach leading to the use of a val"
i('ty of legal trchniqurs to handlr the
~p('eial I<·gal prohlems of tIl!' <1('(-P spa:::.
For ('xample·. r SU~I1l'('t we' will han- It
hroad Oull-r Spat·(, Tn-nty type' insl1'll'
mrnt harring national trrrilorial
claims. As to practical jurisdictional
questions, states will probably simply
extend customary international law
principles r('cognizing national juris.
diction ov('r their ve~sc1s to national
control of activitips on their d('ep sra
installations as weII, and such jurisdic·
tion will he generally recognized; the
United Statrs and the Netherlands have
already tak('n strps along thrsr lin('s.
Perhaps international custom will also
lrad to a broad principle of noninter·
ference with purely scientific drrp seas
rrsearch. On the other hand, special
agreements may be progressively de·
vdoped on an ad hoc basis to deal with
the many other problems we have seen
- an agreement giving some protec·
tion to particular types of mining ac·
tivities; an agreement for the registry
and regulation of permaent installa·
tions and fixed and free·floating buoys;
an agrerment on drep oc('an pollution;
possibly even an arms control agree·
ment relating to underseas weapons
systems.
Pt'rhaps if III('rr is one lrsson in this
survey it is that the provision of Ill'W
law for this new environment will in
itself be an advrnture - a creative
rather than a mrchanical act. Wc sec
that law, and particularly international
law, ('an best he viewed as simply a
1001 which mt'n haw developed to 1ioh·c
thE' problems which arise from group
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Iivinl! - a tool which is pllrposi\'r and
fllnrtionnl. Appral to thr past, to prrccc1rnt_ ancl so-railed doctrine cannot
alonl' l1nswrr the new questions we are
faring. Wr srr that, particularly in the
intl'rnationaI fidd whrre the force of
rlllrs is pr(,lIliarIy dependent on thr
al'rl'ptance by the states to which thcy

an' addressed, law must reflect workahk ('ompromisrs among various statr
inh'n'"I" and pro\'illr ::;rnsihlt, an::;w('TS
10 n'al prohlt'lIl" if il i" 10 Ill' nH'aningfill and I'fTI'I'\;n'. Thl' IlI'xl fl'w }"l'a ..!'
will !'how whl'lhl'r WI' ("an mrl'\ this
challenge in lhr nl'w worlds which arC'
oprning to us.

----'f!----

